The New York Times published a May 1, 2026, article titled “As Israel Entrenches, Frustration With Hezbollah Turns to Support.” The article, written by Christina Goldbaum with visuals by David Guttenfelder, discussed the effect of the current war in Lebanon, mostly in the southern part of the country. This region is home to many Shiites who are the core supporters of the terror organization Hezbollah that is currently fighting yet another war with Israel; a war that began when Hezbollah broke a ceasefire agreement and shot at Israel in March 2026.
In the article, Goldbaum makes two different claims. The first claim is suggested by the title: Israel’s campaign and consolidation of its forces in southern Lebanon works to increase support for Hezbollah. The second claim, in the body to the article, is that many Shiites are very frustrated with Hezbollah, but “their frustration has stopped far short of any abandonment” of the organization.
The first problem is the inconsistency. The Times seems to be arguing that Israel’s actions are distracting Lebanese from their frustration with Hezbollah, pushing them to support the organization. Simultaneously, it is arguing that frustration with Hezbollah is not affecting support for Hezbollah, anyway. So, is the argument that Israel’s actions have no bearing on support for Hezbollah? What, exactly, is the point of the story?
The second problem is even worse: the evidence Goldbaum provides supports neither of the arguments.
Lebanon’s Political Fault Lines
Lebanon has long suffered from political sectarianism. The different groups in Lebanon – Druze, Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Shia Muslims – repeatedly clashed with each other. These clashes were often violent, even manifesting themselves in a long civil war (1975-1990). Severe crises do not necessarily dampen sectarian tensions.
Within this sectarian system, Hezbollah’s power base is the historically marginalized Shia Muslim population that is largely concentrated in southern Lebanon. The recent war between Israel and Hezbollah reignited sectarian tensions. Goldbaum is correct in pointing out that Shia support for Hezbollah is declining, which is significant, although Hezbollah still maintains strong support among its Shia powerbase. Reasons for decline include the killing of Hezbollah’s mythological leader Hasan Nasrallah by Israel in 2024, the fall of Assad’s regime in Syria, the growing toll of wars with Israel, and Hezbollah’s continued involvement in geopolitics. Many Hezbollah supporters now prefer inward focused leadership, tending to domestic issues.
The Evidence Provided
Goldbaum attempts to support her arguments by citing conversations with residents, emergency workers and municipal workers over a 10-day visit in southern Lebanon. These conversations show frustration with the war. Some of them also show support for Hezbollah. But they do not necessarily show the war caused frustration with Hezbollah, nor do they show that frustration has turned to support.
In one case, the author cites a Lebanese woman who says she felt protected when Nasrallah was in power. But now, the woman says, Hezbollah fighters “are the only ones we have” to provide protection. Goldbaum claims this sentiment is common in southern Lebanon. This sentiment does not show any frustration with Hezbollah – it shows support.
In a different case, the author cites another woman who, during a funeral of dead Hezbollah terrorists, says: “they were heroes, they were protecting us.” This statement too indicates support for Hezbollah as well as a personal relationship. Goldbaum herself notes that the dead were the mourners’ loved ones. The same is true for Goldbaum’s description of a woman called Suheila who mourns the loss of her son – who died while fighting for Hezbollah. Suheila decries her personal loss. There is still no verification of the author’s arguments: Goldbaum does not document any change in support for Hezbollah.
In the one time in the article where political support is explicitly mentioned, it is not for Hezbollah. One resident told Goldbaum: “We are with the [Lebanese] government but we want the government to protect us, and not just let Israel do anything it wants.”
What Hezbollah Really Is
Goldbaum misunderstands what Hezbollah is. Calling it an “Iran-backed militant group” misses the fact that Hezbollah is also the de facto sovereign in southern Lebanon. As one Lebanese publisher told The Times already in 2001: “Hezbollah is not stealing the role of the government, the government has disappeared from the south.” The same Times article also described Hezbollah as “a state within a state,” a description that research institutions share. In this context, Goldbaum’s descriptions – including that of a Hezbollah member handing out pro-Iranian flyers that residents can “triumphantly display on their windshields” – are not necessarily indications of popularity, but of how a de-facto ruler exercises its power.
Faulty Logic
Goldbaum might have been able to provide evidence that would have supported her arguments that, despite their inconsistence, suggest Israel’s actions shore up support for Hezbollah and help the group maintain its power. But she does present evidence to readers, surely not in any convincing manner. Goldbaum’s arguments might sound compelling, especially if one wants to show that the war against Hezbollah is self-defeating. But while the arguments sound good, they are not supported.