How can Israel defeat a terrorist organization, rescue hostages, and spare as many innocent lives as possible? This is the question that has been on the mind of every Israeli for nearly 700 days now.
On August 7, Israel announced a new plan aimed at achieving these goals. Immediately, hysterical headlines proclaimed supposed Israeli plans to “occupy” Gaza, while articles overwhelmingly focused on criticisms of the plan. They omitted, however, any discussion of the challenging situation Israelis face and the competing considerations confronting them. And while there are plenty of legitimate reasons to criticize Israel’s new plan, absent from media discussions were any realistic alternatives.
But these considerations are crucial for understanding the situation in the Middle East. Below is an overview of the background, Israel’s alternatives, and reasons to support and criticize each of those options.
Background
Israel’s new plan, announced on August 7, involves two main components: (1) the capture and control of Gaza City, the Gaza Strip’s largest urban area, and (2) the distribution of humanitarian aid to civilians outside of the combat zones. Details of the second component apparently include a plan to scale up aid through the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, including quadrupling the number of aid sites from four to 16.
The government simultaneously adopted “five principles for concluding the war” against Hamas, including: (1) Hamas’s disarmament; (2) the return of all hostages; (3) the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip; (4) Israeli security control of the Gaza Strip; and (5) the establishment of “an alternative civil administration” that is neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority.
Contrary to hysterical claims, Israel does not plan to permanently re-occupy the Gaza Strip. This matters.
Following a defensive war in 1967, Israel controlled Gaza – which was previously under Egyptian control – until 2005. That year, Israel made a unilateral peace gesture toward the Palestinians, withdrawing every Israeli soldier and civilian from the territory and handing control over to the Palestinian Authority (PA). Shortly after, Hamas launched a violent assault on the PA in Gaza which ended with the latter’s ejection from the territory. This resulted in a terrorist organization, Hamas, imposing de facto authority over the entirety of the Gaza Strip, much like the Islamic State would later do in parts of Iraq and Syria.
Hamas, whose Charter calls for the destruction of Israel, quickly began using its newfound territorial control to grow its military capabilities. Since then, tens of thousands of rockets, missiles, and mortars have been launched toward Israeli communities, eventually culminating in the October 7 massacre, a surprise attack launched by Hamas that resulted in the murder, torture, rape, and kidnapping of over 1,400 Israelis.
An Israeli soldier comforts a resident of Neve Dekalim, an Israeli community that was forcibly evacuated during Israel’s 2005 disengagement from Gaza. Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons
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Israel’s decision to withdraw from Gaza in 2005 remains controversial. A recent survey found that 76% of Israelis believe the decision to withdraw from Gaza without an agreement was a mistake. The images of Israeli families being forcibly uprooted from their homes by Israeli soldiers in a failed attempt at peace remains seared into the minds of most Israelis, especially now as Israeli soldiers have been forced to return to rescue Israeli civilians held hostage by Palestinian terrorists, 50 of whom still remain. Still, Israel does not seek to undo the 2005 withdrawal, and the same survey found that Israelis are evenly split on whether Israel should permanently reestablish Israeli communities in Gaza.
The Previous Strategy
Israel’s military operations in Gaza have thus far failed to fully achieve Israel’s stated objectives of freeing the hostages and destroying Hamas’s ability to govern Gaza and attack Israel. Until now, Israel’s military has largely operated by entering, clearing, and then withdrawing from specific areas in Gaza. While this has severely degraded Hamas’s military capabilities, the terrorist organization was still capable of returning to many of those “cleared” areas and reestablishing control over the local population.
The reestablishment of control, even if limited, meant Hamas could continue sustaining itself, including by pilfering humanitarian aid meant for Palestinian civilians. The United Nations recently admitted that 88% of its aid in Gaza was being “intercepted,” including by Hamas. Another recent report indicates that Hamas has been able to skim as much as 20% from cash assistance programs.
Thus, while Israel has severely weakened Hamas, the existing strategy was proving inadequate.
Two Difficult Choices
Given the failure of the existing strategy, two alternative strategies have been widely discussed in Israeli society and beyond. While media outlets seek to flatten the discussion and focus only on criticizing the option selected by Israeli leadership, the reality is far more complex. Each option carried serious tradeoffs.
Which strategy should Israel have pursued? It’s not clear that there is a right answer. Each option has its advantages and disadvantages, considered below.
Option 1: The Government Plan
One of the widely discussed options boiled down to taking what remaining territory Hamas operates in and staying there until a new Arab civilian authority can replace Hamas. This is the option selected by the government – though with an important difference. Rather than reoccupying all of the Gaza Strip, the plan announced on August 7 involves taking over just Gaza City, the major urban center of the Gaza Strip.
Map of Gaza. Courtesy: CIA World Factbook
The Positives: Whereas Israel has effectively degraded Hamas’s military capabilities, now too it would be able to destroy the terrorist organization’s governing capabilities. No longer would the terrorist organization be able to pilfer humanitarian aid to resell to needy civilians at exorbitant prices. Nor would Hamas be able to sustain itself through collecting taxes or extorting local businesses.
By firmly establishing security control, Israel would actually make it possible for an alternative Arab civil authority to take control without having to contend with the threat of Hamas. Notable is that the League of Arab States – several members of which have been floated as potential partners in helping govern Gaza pending a final peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians – openly called on Hamas to “end its rule in Gaza.”
Another positive is that accompanying the planned takeover of Gaza City is a surge in the humanitarian aid efforts. It is anticipated that, in addition to the quadrupling of aid sites, Israeli forces will scale up efforts to provide housing and other basic services for displaced Gazans.
In short, this option – on paper, at least – is actually capable of achieving Israel’s war goal of removing the Hamas threat.
The Negatives: Given that the government chose a more limited version – focusing just on Gaza City – it’s unclear whether the watered-down strategy is still capable of achieving the war goals.
Furthermore, it is feared that such a strategy threatens another of Israel’s war goals: rescuing the hostages held by Hamas. While Israeli forces have successfully rescued some hostages through military operations, on other occasions Hamas has executed hostages, including children, as Israeli forces approached. It is highly unlikely that even the IDF will be able to successfully carry out any rescue operations for the remaining living hostages.
Other criticisms include the financial costs. While Israel’s economy has proven surprisingly resilient amidst the war, continued and expanded military operations inevitably draw resources away from Israeli growth. Furthermore, there is the wear and tear on military personnel and resources. Young Israelis have shown a remarkable determination to serve, but the continued disruption for the lives of reservists is taking its toll. Furthermore, as global defense spending continues surging, Israel’s ability to maintain and rebuild its stock of military supplies grows ever more precarious.
There is also the international reaction to such a plan. What responses might European nations take that could threaten other Israeli interests? Already, Germany has claimed it will stop selling defense supplies to the Jewish state.
Option 2: The Hostage Deal Plan
The other often discussed option is to focus on securing a ceasefire agreement with Hamas that would see the release of the hostages in exchange for the end of the war.
The Positives: The most important benefit of such a plan is that it is perhaps the safest way to return as many hostages alive as possible. As Hamas’s cruel and cynical propaganda videos recently showed, Israelis are being held captive in horrific conditions. Israel is a small, tightly-knit country of 10 million where almost everyone knows someone victimized during the 10/7 attack. The sense of moral obligation to do everything possible to save their family members, friends, and/or neighbors suffering at the hands of terrorists is enormous.
Evyatar David (Left) and Rom Braslavski (Right), two Israelis held hostage by Hamas as seen in recent propaganda videos released by the terrorist organization.
A ceasefire deal would also avoid all the negatives of the government plan. It would prevent the continued drain on Israeli resources and, theoretically, reduce Israel’s diplomatic isolation.
There is also broad public support for such a deal, with surveys suggesting most Israelis want to end the war with the release of the hostages. Of course, the devil is in the details of how such a deal could be accomplished and what such a deal would look like.
Such a deal also may make more sense now than it did several months ago. While Hamas remains a threat, the larger threat faced by Israel – from Iran and Hezbollah – has been severely diminished following the success of Israel’s military operations in Lebanon and Iran. With Hamas now isolated, proponents of a ceasefire deal argue the terrorist organization’s continued existence may not be the danger it once was.
The Negatives: It’s not clear whether Hamas would even be capable of delivering on any promise to release all the remaining hostages. Hamas was not the only organization which took hostages during the 10/7 attack and – given the heavy casualties Hamas has sustained – it is plausible that they may not even know anymore where some of the deceased hostages were buried.
Moreover, it takes two to reach a deal, and Hamas – emboldened by recent diplomatic moves by the UK, Canada, and France – has only become more intransigent. Any currently feasible ceasefire deal will also inevitably leave Hamas in power. Common sense dictates the terrorist organization will not agree to its own demise, and no foreign Arab entity is likely to agree to take control of Gaza while Hamas could threaten them. While proponents of such a deal argue that Israel will be able to prevent Hamas from significantly rebuilding its military capabilities, this is not readily apparent. The horrific October 7 massacre was preceded by just such a disastrous policy of “mowing the lawn,” whereby Israeli policy was to simply contain the Hamas threat from getting too big. Additionally, it’s unlikely Hamas would agree to a deal without third-party guarantees against Israel renewing military operations against Hamas. This means that even if Israel sees a growing threat, it will have to contend with foreign pressure – perhaps including the U.S. – limiting its operational freedom in Gaza.
History also raises a moral dilemma, given any deal to release the hostages will almost certainly involve the release of hundreds of Palestinian terrorists in Israeli prisons. In 2011, Israel agreed to release 1,000 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for a single Israeli soldier taken hostage by Hamas five years earlier. Aside from denying justice to the victims of those prisoners, many of the latter returned to their terrorist activities, resulting in even more victims. Some of those released even participated in the 10/7 attack which resulted in the taking of 251 hostages. Among those released terrorists: Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s former leader and the architect of the October 7 massacre.
Finally, there is the power of symbolism. Hamas will portray such a deal as a victory and as validation of the atrocities it carried out on 10/7. Such a deal threatens to send the wrong message: that murder, hostage-taking, and atrocities work. In particular, it incentivizes Palestinian terrorists to double down on hostage-taking as a strategy, given Israel’s pattern of rewarding the tactic.
No Perfect Answers
Simply put, there are no good answers to the predicament Israel faces. The government’s decision is ripe for criticism, but so too would be any other decision. Responsible journalists must not ignore the morally and factually challenging circumstances Israel faces by glossing over competing considerations at play.