A recent New York Times column suggests that if the United States gives Iran control over the Strait of Hormuz with the right to toll ships passing through its waters, the country will moderate and even renege on its current policies, including its nuclear aspirations. The Aug. 24, 2026, op-ed was written by Rosemary Kelanic of the think tank Defense Priorities and titled “Let Iran Control the Strait of Hormuz.” Kelanic claims that with the right financial incentives, the Islamic Republic of Iran could turn into the Islamic Republic of Economics.
Kelanic’s Argument
The idea that economic motivations play such an important role in Iranian decision- and policy-making demonstrates a flawed understanding of the regime. What Kleanic’s column exemplifies is a U.S.-centric analysis of Iran that (mis-)judges the country. Kelanic imposes on Iran American hopes, wishes, and concepts rather than examining Iran by using its own ideology and interests.
Kelanic’s main argument is that the current struggle over Hormuz has come to a standstill: the United States cannot fully open the Strait, while Iran cannot completely close it. This situation is essentially a loss for the U.S. However, letting Iran control and toll the waterway is the least bad option and will remove the cause of major disruptions to global oil markets. As the U.S. attempts to cut its losses, letting Iran control the Strait and levy passage fees on ships might actually yield positive results and force the country to adopt more moderate foreign policies:
As embarrassing as Hormuz taxes would be for the United States and for Mr. Trump personally, monetizing safe passage would encourage Iran to allow through as many ships as possible so it can collect more tolls. And if Iran grows dependent on revenue from administering the strait, closing it in the future for political reasons becomes more difficult.
Iran is already in talks with Oman about the strait’s future. Joint custodianship of the waterway could foster regional cooperation and spur Iran to demonstrate responsibility by mellowing its rhetoric and behavior. It could eventually allow Iran to rejoin the international community, conferring recognition that would make it easier for Iran to surrender its nuclear program, which functions as an alternative source of prestige.
Kelanic’s fundamental assumption that economic considerations are a primary motivator in Iran’s foreign policy is demonstrably wrong.
The United States imposed primary sanctions on Iran after the 1979 hostage crisis. The European Council and Japan followed suit in 1980, only to lift their sanctions months later after the release of the hostages. The United States imposed the first round of secondary sanctions in 1996, and the U.N. imposed global sanctions on Iran in 2006. Since then, barring a brief period between 2015 and 2018, international sanctions have increased.
The sanctions had a debilitating effect on the Iranian economy, but this did not fundamentally alter Iran’s belligerent behavior. While a nuclear agreement was reached in 2015, giving Iran sanctions relief, the resulting economic boost primarily benefited the corrupt regime, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its network of ideologically aligned terrorist proxies throughout the region. Everyday Iranians saw little economic improvement. In 2017, Iranians held their first major anti-regime protests since the Green Movement, partially fueled by economic deterioration.
It is very hard to square the Iranian regime’s behavior and its acceptance of economically debilitating sanctions with the argument that economics are the main motivating factor in Iranian decision-making rather than ideology, power, and politics.
The regime makes no secret of the fact that it is motivated by its own interests and revolutionary ideology instead of Western concepts of peace and prosperity. Earlier this month, an IRGC spokesperson publicly said exactly this, stating: “for us, the Strait of Hormuz is not merely an economic waterway, but rather a key component of our geopolitical and strategic power.” (Emphasis added)
Controlling the Strait will not moderate Iran. To the contrary, it will give powerful leverage to a rogue regime. It will also hand Iran an important deterrent as it rebuilds its nuclear program.
Oil Myopia
Kelanic also implies that the growing demand for electric vehicles (EVs) will gradually decrease the significance of the Strait. This suggests Iranian control and taxing would not strengthen the country as one might think; a suggestion that suffers from extreme oil myopia.
While oil might be the most talked-about energy crisis with regard to the current Hormuz crisis, geopolitical instability has created a second, lesser-known energy crisis highly detrimental to EV production and renewable energy.
As one market research company noted: “the EV transition, designed to reduce oil dependency, has created a deeper dependency on energy-intensive and Hormuz-routed materials,” such as Sulfur, aluminum, helium, and semiconductors. The Atlantic Council adds: “what Hormuz has exposed is not a temporary shock, but a permanent vulnerability built into the energy transition’s own design.” And: “the energy transition built its manufacturing supply chains on a chemical produced as waste from the industry it is competing with” (namely, the oil industry).
Kelanic is right in pointing out that the EV market is expected to grow, but this is exactly why she is wrong about the Strait of Hormuz. It’s significance won’t so easily disappear.
On Oil and Burgers at War
Kelanic’s theory notably echoes that made in another New York Times high-profile op-ed that erroneously suggested economic development mitigates conflict.
In a 1996 column, Thomas Friedman advanced the “Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention.” Friedman claimed that a certain level of economic development – often symbolized by the opening of a McDonald’s to satisfy middle-class consumption – can make that country less prone to engage in war. Friedman said he was making his argument “tongue in cheek,” but still claimed there was a correlation between economic development, McDonald’s, and peace. Therefore, Friedman argued: “no two countries that both have a McDonald’s have ever fought a war against each other.”
Friedman’s theory was profoundly wrong and naive. A 2020 Foreign Policy article by political scientist Paul Musgrave was titled “The Beautiful, Dumb Dream of the McDonalds Peace Theory,” gives several examples refuting Friedman’s thesis. Musgrave noted how Friedman’s idea exemplified the tendency of Americans to imagine the world in their own image. Similarly, Kelanic’s column shows the Times is judging the Hormuz crisis mainly through American eyes seeking to reduce oil costs and engage in wishful thinking.
So, the Times had already made the mistaken assumption that economic development mitigates conflict. Why did the outlet choose to repeat it, especially in this case, when the stakes are so high?