In “Why Iran Isn’t Backing Down on Lebanon,” published on May 30, 2026, Newsweek senior writer, Tom O’Connor, quotes four different people. The article is commendably balanced, and it includes two American former officials, an Israeli academic, and an Iranian journalist, providing the views of all belligerents. Unfortunately, O’Connor fails to disclose the Iranian’s background.
Khamenei.ir, CC BY 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons
O’Connor introduced Hassan Beheshtipour simply as “an Iranian international affairs analyst.” But Beheshtipour was a journalist for Iranian state television and was close to the office of the late supreme leader, Ali Khamenei.
He is quoted as saying, “Iran does not see itself facing a choice between ‘an economic deal’ and ‘supporting Hezbollah,’” adding, “From Tehran’s perspective, a ceasefire in Lebanon is a fundamental condition for any agreement with the United States.”
Beheshtipour added, “In Iran’s view, threats in West Asia are interconnected, and the continuation of war in Lebanon directly affects Iran’s strategic stability.”
Simply put, according to Beheshtipour, Iran views Hezbollah as a pillar of its foreign policy and would only agree to a deal that would protect Hezbollah and lift the financial pressure on Iran.
There are some subtle tells here. First, most Iranians use the term “Middle East,” and West Asia is not a commonly used phrase in Persian. The previous supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, preferred this wording to reinforce his narrative of an East vs. West civilizational struggle. This way, he could depict Iran as an Asian actor against the West.
Even the average regime official does not use this phrase. For example, Ali Larijani, a loyal regime foot soldier and Khamenei confidant, used to use “the Middle East” instead. In contrast, Beheshtipour’s use of “West Asia” shows that, even within the confines of the regime, Beheshtipour is ideologically a Khameneist.
Beheshtipour is a specific type of regime figure: He worked at the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, which is the state media and the only legal broadcast in Iran, as an analyst and helped found PressTV, the regime’s English language propaganda network. In Persian, Beheshitpour’s “scholarship” is dedicated to reaffirming the regime’s preconceptions to its base through sophistry. In English, he propagates them to a foreign audience.
Beheshtipour has contributed to Ali Khamenei’s website on four occasions. His articles and interviews range from a defense of the 1979 hostage crisis, when the new revolutionary regime abducted American diplomats for 444 days, to theorizing about strengthening Iran’s hand against Russia in bilateral relations by exploiting Russia’s economic woes. On the hostage crisis, he shirked Iran of responsibility, arguing that because the students kidnapped the diplomats, the government had no responsibility towards them. (This fails to explain how the government of Iran managed to release them after reaching an agreement with the U.S. government.)
His writings reflect the old supreme leader’s paranoia of a “soft war” against Iran. Soft war is what Khamenei and his acolytes have used to describe the U.S. soft power, especially the American cultural appeal to the Iranian youth in contrast with the regime’s medieval practices, but the use of the word war implies that this is a coordinated and hostile policy by the U.S. government. Essentially, they believe that cultural products coming out of Hollywood and fashion magazines are akin to missiles directed at Iran, as opposed to organic creations with no U.S. government backing. Beheshtipour even believes that the U.S. government sponsors publishing books to defend U.S. policy toward Iran. I wish!
Giving air to the enemy’s view is a good thing. The ancient Chinese war theorist Sun Tzu said, “Know thyself, and know they enemy, and you shall not be defeated in a hundred battles.” But this leads us to the second problem: O’Connor barely probed Beheshtipour’s claims.
To argue that Iran’s strategic stability is tied to support for Hezbollah is correct, but strategy serves a state’s political objective. Beheshtipour’s assertion omits an important point: Why does Iran insist on a foreign policy that exposes it to foreign attacks? Which is to say, why does Iran insist on enmity with the United States and Israel, which has brought so much destruction?
This animosity is due to the personal views of the regime’s founder, Ruhollah Khomeini, which then became a bedrock of the regime’s support among its base, as well as a tool for its quest to position itself as the leader of the Muslim ummah.
O’Connor made two mistakes in an otherwise well-balanced article. First, he failed to explain that Beheshtipour is a mouthpiece of the Islamic Republic, likely because he did not know enough about his subject. This led to the second mistake: He did not take advantage of his subject to expose the paranoia that dictates the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy.
The dispute between the Islamic Republic on the one hand and the United States and Israel on the other is simple: The Islamic Republic aspires to erase Israel from the map, which is why it sees Hezbollah as a strategic pillar, while the United States and Israel wish for the Jewish state to exist. The U.S. and Israeli objective is rational, while the Islamic Republic’s is irrational and has cost the Iranian people and even the regime’s leadership a great deal. A good journalist would have asked a simple question of a regime intellectual whose worldview perfectly captures the regime’s paranoia: Why?